Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theorists

Michael McKenna

doi:10.1093/monist/onab016

Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theorists

Michael McKenna

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Wimpy retributivism finds reasons to refrain from giving the blameworthy and culpable what they deserve, even if it comes to very little. These reasons have to do with the moral hazards of being mistaken about when harsh treatment is justified. A moral influence theory can help supplement retributivist reasons with further consequentialist considerations and thereby keep these skeptical worries in check.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	510-525
Number of pages	16
Journal	Monist
Volume	104
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onab016
State	Published - Oct 1 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1093/monist/onab016

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Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theorists

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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