Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Scopus citations


Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSynthese Library
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages19
StatePublished - 2018

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
ISSN (Print)0166-6991
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8292


  • Credences
  • Epistemic probability
  • Evidential probability
  • Evidentialism
  • Hybrid theory
  • Reliabilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • History
  • Language and Linguistics
  • Logic


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