@inbook{832a78ba9b4d47518f22c0556d5545d3,
title = "Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?",
abstract = "Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist.",
keywords = "Credences, Epistemic probability, Evidential probability, Evidentialism, Hybrid theory, Reliabilism",
author = "Juan Comesa{\~n}a",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature.",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_18",
language = "English (US)",
series = "Synthese Library",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media B.V.",
pages = "307--325",
booktitle = "Synthese Library",
}