Abstract
Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is "safe". and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge - that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa's definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa's most recent refinements to the notion of safety don't help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 395-404 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 146 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2005 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- General Social Sciences