TY - JOUR
T1 - Trust between individuals and groups
T2 - Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy
AU - Kugler, Tamar
AU - Bornstein, Gary
AU - Kocher, Martin G.
AU - Sutter, Matthias
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank an anonymous referee and the editor in charge, Chris Starmer, as well as seminar participants at the ESA World Meeting 2002 in Boston and the Max-Planck-Institute, Jena, for many helpful suggestions and comments. All errors are ours. Financial support from the Center of Experimental Economics at the University of Innsbruck (sponsored by Raiffeisen-Landesbank Tirol), the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF – Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung in Österreich, grant no. 16617), the Austrian Central Bank (Jubiläumsfondsprojekt no. 9879), and the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 535/05) is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2 × 2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
AB - We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2 × 2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
KW - Decision making
KW - Group behavior
KW - Trust game
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U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2006.12.003
DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2006.12.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33947589561
VL - 28
SP - 646
EP - 657
JO - Journal of Economic Psychology
JF - Journal of Economic Psychology
SN - 0167-4870
IS - 6
ER -