TY - JOUR
T1 - Trust and trustworthiness in networked exchange
AU - Cassar, Alessandra
AU - Rigdon, Mary
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ The authors would like to thank the participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in Rome (June 2007) and Tucson (October 2007), the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University (September 2008), STIET at the University of Michigan (October 2008), Texas A & M (October 2008), St. Andrews University (November 2008), and the University of Edinburgh (November 2008). Dan Friedman, Yan Chen, and Anthony Gillies provided valuable comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to the Advisory Editor and two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. For research assistance, the authors thank Noura Hamid. For funding support, Cassar thanks the University of San Francisco and Rigdon thanks the University of Michigan. * Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Rigdon).
PY - 2011/3
Y1 - 2011/3
N2 - This paper focuses on the interaction between network structure, the role of information, and the level of trust and trustworthiness in 3-node networks. We extend the investment game with one Sender and one Receiver to networked versions - one characterized by one Sender and two Receivers ([. 1s-2r]) and one characterized by two Senders and one Receiver ([. 2s-1r]) - under two information conditions, full and partial. We develop a comparative model of trust for the networked exchange environments and generate two hypotheses: (1) what counts as a signal of trust depends on investment behavior along the other link in the network and (2) this type of trust can be leveraged under full information, increasing the rate of cooperation on the side of the exchange with multiple traders. The results generally support our hypotheses: trust is comparative and under full information, the [. 1s-2r] network shows higher trustworthiness and the [. 2s-1r] network displays higher trust.
AB - This paper focuses on the interaction between network structure, the role of information, and the level of trust and trustworthiness in 3-node networks. We extend the investment game with one Sender and one Receiver to networked versions - one characterized by one Sender and two Receivers ([. 1s-2r]) and one characterized by two Senders and one Receiver ([. 2s-1r]) - under two information conditions, full and partial. We develop a comparative model of trust for the networked exchange environments and generate two hypotheses: (1) what counts as a signal of trust depends on investment behavior along the other link in the network and (2) this type of trust can be leveraged under full information, increasing the rate of cooperation on the side of the exchange with multiple traders. The results generally support our hypotheses: trust is comparative and under full information, the [. 1s-2r] network shows higher trustworthiness and the [. 2s-1r] network displays higher trust.
KW - Experiment
KW - Information
KW - Investment
KW - Networks
KW - Trust
KW - Trustworthiness
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.003
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79951959494
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 71
SP - 282
EP - 303
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -