Thinking about the liar, fast and slow

Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski, Jonathan M. Weinberg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

4 Scopus citations


In the past, experimental philosophers have explored the psychological underpinning of a number of notions in philosophy, including free will, moral responsibility, and more. But prior to this chapter, although a number of philosophers have speculated on how ordinary folks might, or should, think about the liar paradox, no one had systematically explored the psychological underpinnings of the Liar itself. The authors take on this task. In particular, the chapter investigates the status of a liar sentence, L = ‘Sentence L is false’. The thesis, arrived at by interpreting the data the authors have accrued, is that reflective thinkers (some of whom possess a modicum of philosophical expertise) judge L to be neither true nor false (as opposed to false or true), and the authors see this as some evidence for the claim that L is neither true nor false.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationReflections on the Liar
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages32
ISBN (Electronic)9780199896042
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017


  • Arne næss
  • Cognitive reflection test
  • Dual-process theory
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Liar paradox
  • Semantic status
  • Truth value
  • Wason’s selection task

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Arts and Humanities(all)


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