The sound of silence: A license to be selfish

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo; Martin Dufwenberg; Stefano Papa

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045

The sound of silence: A license to be selfish

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	68-70
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	182
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045
State	Published - Sep 2019

Keywords

Active-non-communication
Cost of lying
Pre-fab promises
Psychological costs
Trust game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045

Cite this

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title = "The sound of silence: A license to be selfish",

abstract = "We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.",

keywords = "Active-non-communication, Cost of lying, Pre-fab promises, Psychological costs, Trust game",

author = "{Di Bartolomeo}, Giovanni and Martin Dufwenberg and Stefano Papa",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2019",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.045",

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AU - Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni

AU - Dufwenberg, Martin

AU - Papa, Stefano

PY - 2019/9

Y1 - 2019/9

N2 - We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

AB - We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

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KW - Pre-fab promises

KW - Psychological costs

KW - Trust game

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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The sound of silence: A license to be selfish

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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