The role of reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

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18 Scopus citations

Abstract

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)203-223
Number of pages21
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume80
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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