TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
AU - Smit, Houston
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.
AB - There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-0114.00080
DO - 10.1111/1468-0114.00080
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:60949272458
SN - 0279-0750
VL - 80
SP - 203
EP - 223
JO - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
IS - 2
ER -