TY - JOUR
T1 - The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels, 1910-1930
AU - Fishback, Price V.
AU - Kantor, Shawn Everett
N1 - Funding Information:
This research has been supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223058, the University of Arizona Foundation, the Earhart Foundation, and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture. We benefited greatly from the comments of Lee Alston, Doc Ghose, Claudia Goldin, Gary Libecap, Joseph Sicilian, John Wallis, Thomas Weiss, John Wooders, anonymous referees, and participants in seminars at the University of Kansas and the NBER-DAE program meeting in March 1997. Responsibility for the interpretations and shortcomings of the paper remains ours.
PY - 1998/4
Y1 - 1998/4
N2 - Most members of the key economic interest groups with a stake in workers' compensation anticipated gains. Despite their general agreement on the superiority of a no-fault system of accident compensation, the various interest groups fought over the level of accident benefits the new law would provide. These legislated benefit levels were important because they determined each group's share of the rents that workers' compensation created. The disputes were ultimately settled by state legislators who responded to pressures from both employer and worker groups. An empirical analysis of the workers' compensation benefit parameters that emerged from the political process shows that employers in high-accident risk industries succeeded in securing relatively lower benefits, while those in high-wage industries succeeded in keeping benefit levels in check. Employers' successes in lobbying for their optimal benefits were tempered in states where organized labor was strong, where political reform movements led to political shifts in the state legislature, and where bureaucratic agencies administered the workers' compensation system.
AB - Most members of the key economic interest groups with a stake in workers' compensation anticipated gains. Despite their general agreement on the superiority of a no-fault system of accident compensation, the various interest groups fought over the level of accident benefits the new law would provide. These legislated benefit levels were important because they determined each group's share of the rents that workers' compensation created. The disputes were ultimately settled by state legislators who responded to pressures from both employer and worker groups. An empirical analysis of the workers' compensation benefit parameters that emerged from the political process shows that employers in high-accident risk industries succeeded in securing relatively lower benefits, while those in high-wage industries succeeded in keeping benefit levels in check. Employers' successes in lobbying for their optimal benefits were tempered in states where organized labor was strong, where political reform movements led to political shifts in the state legislature, and where bureaucratic agencies administered the workers' compensation system.
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U2 - 10.1006/exeh.1998.0696
DO - 10.1006/exeh.1998.0696
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0040681729
SN - 0014-4983
VL - 35
SP - 109
EP - 139
JO - Explorations in Economic History
JF - Explorations in Economic History
IS - 2
ER -