TY - JOUR
T1 - The incompatibility of free will and naturalism
AU - Turner, Jason
PY - 2009/12
Y1 - 2009/12
N2 - The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defence of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the worldthat is, even if libertarians are right, free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those provided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview. The Consequence Argument has a sister argumentI call it the Supervenience Argumentwhich cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question.
AB - The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defence of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the worldthat is, even if libertarians are right, free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those provided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview. The Consequence Argument has a sister argumentI call it the Supervenience Argumentwhich cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question.
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U2 - 10.1080/00048400802598652
DO - 10.1080/00048400802598652
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77951750195
SN - 0004-8402
VL - 87
SP - 565
EP - 587
JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
IS - 4
ER -