The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert

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4 Scopus citations


A familiar claim in the free will debate is that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In this paper, I seek a rationale for this claim, offer an explanation of basic desert, and then argue that the free will debate can persist even when divorced from basic desert.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Ethics
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019


  • Blame
  • Desert
  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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