TY - JOUR
T1 - The diagonal and the demon
AU - Comesaña, Juan
N1 - Funding Information:
∗ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2001 Graduate Conference in Epistemology, Rochester University, the 2001 Harvard-MIT Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, the 2001 Columbia Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, and at the XIX International Philosophy Congress, Skepticism, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, México; I am grateful to the audiences at those conferences for their questions and comments. Many thanks to Stewart Cohen, James Dreier, Jordi Fernández, Mark Heller, David Matheson, Agustín Rayo, Joseph Shieber and Gabriel Uzquiano for very helpful comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Manuel Comesaña, Michael Pace, Carolina Sartorio, and Ernest Sosa, who read several drafts and offered extremely generous doses of suggestions and support. Research leading to this paper was supported in part by a grant from Fundación Antorchas.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, "indexical reliabilism", based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems.
AB - Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, "indexical reliabilism", based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems.
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U2 - 10.1023/A:1020656411534
DO - 10.1023/A:1020656411534
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:25444493065
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 110
SP - 249
EP - 266
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 3
ER -