Abstract
This chapter argues that Kantian-inspired conceptions of morality must embrace significant parts of an evolutionary view of ethics. According to one sort of Kantian, to respect others as free and equal persons requires that the moral demands made on them are uniquely justified from the impartial perspective. It is argued that under conditions of evaluative pluralism, this idea of impartial reflection is indeterminate. Rational reflection can narrow the field, but actual interactions of good-willed people are needed to fill in the large gaps, and give us a morality that we all can will. Morality is properly seen as consisting of self-imposed requirements verified from the impartial perspective and as having a history that is path-dependent. Indeed, only an evolved morality can be justified to everyone.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Partiality and Impartiality |
Subtitle of host publication | Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191595233 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199579952 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2011 |
Keywords
- Evolution
- Impartiality
- Kantian ethics
- Public reason
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)