Abstract
We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 119-131 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Mathematical Methods of Operations Research |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2001 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Consistency
- Normative game theory
- Self- enforcing recommendation
- Set-valued solution
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- General Mathematics
- Management Science and Operations Research