Abstract
We investigate the backdating of stock option exercises. Before SOX, we find evidence that some exercises were backdated to days with low stock prices. Consistent with a tax-based incentive, these suspect exercises are more likely when the personal tax savings from backdating are higher. However, suspect CEO exercises generate average (median) estimated tax savings of $96,000 ($7,000). These savings appear modest relative to the costs insiders and firms face. We find that the likelihood of a suspect exercise increases in the likelihood of option grant backdating. This suggests that agency problems associated with backdating permeate option compensation in some firms.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 27-49 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Journal of Accounting and Economics |
Volume | 47 |
Issue number | 1-2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Backdating
- Insider trading
- Regulation
- Stock option compensation
- Taxes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics