Tax evasion with a conscience

Martin Dufwenberg, Katarina Nordblom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

How do moral concerns affect fraud and detection, for example, tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring a psychological (Formula presented.) inspection game which incorporates belief-dependent guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the inspector's more than the inspectee's) as well as the policy issue whether to allow the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-29
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2022
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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