Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

Amnon Rapoport; Darryl A. Seale; Lisa Ordóñez

doi:10.1023/A:1016315329973

Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

Amnon Rapoport
, Darryl A. Seale
, Lisa Ordóñez

Management and Organizations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	21-45
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Volume	25
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016315329973
State	Published - 2002

Keywords

Interactive decision making
Lotteries
Nash equilibrium
Tacit coordination

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Accounting
Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1023/A:1016315329973

Cite this

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title = "Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries",

abstract = "Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.",

keywords = "Interactive decision making, Lotteries, Nash equilibrium, Tacit coordination",

author = "Amnon Rapoport and Seale, \{Darryl A.\} and Lisa Ord{\'o}{\~n}ez",

note = "Funding Information: The research reported here has been supported in part by NSF Grant No. SBR-9512724 and in part by a grant from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (Project No. CA98/ 99.BM01). We wish to thank Colin F. Camerer and Eyal Winter for many useful suggestions. The first author also wishes to thank the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for its support and hospitality.",

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doi = "10.1023/A:1016315329973",

language = "English (US)",

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T1 - Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

AU - Rapoport, Amnon

AU - Seale, Darryl A.

AU - Ordóñez, Lisa

N1 - Funding Information: The research reported here has been supported in part by NSF Grant No. SBR-9512724 and in part by a grant from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council (Project No. CA98/ 99.BM01). We wish to thank Colin F. Camerer and Eyal Winter for many useful suggestions. The first author also wishes to thank the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for its support and hospitality.

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.

AB - Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.

KW - Interactive decision making

KW - Lotteries

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Tacit coordination

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U2 - 10.1023/A:1016315329973

DO - 10.1023/A:1016315329973

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:0141625310

SN - 0895-5646

VL - 25

SP - 21

EP - 45

JO - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

JF - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

IS - 1

ER -

Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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