Abstract
I maintain, in defending "thirdism," that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the "preliminary probability" 1/4 to the statement S: "Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads." (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 155-159 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 160 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2008 |
Keywords
- Bayesian updating
- Credence
- Epistemic probability
- Preliminary probability
- Probability
- Sleeping Beauty
- Synchronic Bayesian updating
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- General Social Sciences