Abstract
James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call "basic justification theories." I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 215-219 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Logos and Episteme |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- A priori
- Basic justification theories
- Bootstrapping
- Perception
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
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