Suppositional reasoning and perceptual justification

Stewart Cohen

doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20167220

Suppositional reasoning and perceptual justification

Stewart Cohen

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call "basic justification theories." I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	215-219
Number of pages	5
Journal	Logos and Episteme
Volume	7
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20167220
State	Published - 2016

Keywords

A priori
Basic justification theories
Bootstrapping
Perception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.5840/logos-episteme20167220

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Suppositional reasoning and perceptual justification

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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