Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing through Backup Reservation in a Competitive Environment

Jing Hou, Li Sun, Tao Shu, Yong Xiaoy, Marwan Krunzz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In transitioning to 5G, the high infrastructure cost, the need for fast rollout of new services, and the frequent technology/system upgrades triggered wireless operators to consider adopting the cost-effective network infrastructure sharing (NIS), even among competitors, to gain technology and market access. To collaborate with competitors, NIS is a bargain whose terms and conditions need to be carefully determined to guarantee profitability in a market with uncertainties. In this work, we propose a strategic NIS framework for contractual backup reservation between a small/local network operator of limited resources and uncertain demands, and one resourceful operator with potentially redundant capacity. The backup reservation agreement requires the local operator (say, operator A) to pay a fixed reservation fee to the resource-owning operator (say, operator B) at fixed time intervals. In return, the operator B guarantees availability of its resource (e.g., spectrum) up to a predetermined level. In such a way, a certain amount of backup resource capacity is reserved for future use under high traffic demand. We characterize the bargaining between the operators in terms of the optimal reservation prices and resource reservation quantities w/o considerations of the competitions between operators in market share. The conditions under which the competitive operators will cooperate are explored. The impacts of competition intensity, redundant capacity, and demand uncertainty on performance under backup reservation are also investigated. Our study shows that NIS through backup reservation leads to both higher resource utilization and profits for operators, as well as higher service levels for end users. We also find that, under certain conditions, operator B will share its resources with operator A even at the risk of impinging on its own users, and the impact of competition intensity on the sharing decisions is highly dependent on the amount of potential redundant capacity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2019 16th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking, SECON 2019
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)9781728112077
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2019
Event16th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking, SECON 2019 - Boston, United States
Duration: Jun 10 2019Jun 13 2019

Publication series

NameAnnual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks workshops
Volume2019-June
ISSN (Print)2155-5486
ISSN (Electronic)2155-5494

Conference

Conference16th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking, SECON 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBoston
Period6/10/196/13/19

Keywords

  • Network infrastructure sharing
  • backup reservation
  • competition
  • game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing through Backup Reservation in a Competitive Environment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this