Strategic information transmission: A survey of experiments and theoretical foundations

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper surveys the experimental literature on communication of private information via cheap-talk messages. Some players have private information that is relevant to the decisions made by others. The informed players have the option to send messages before decisions are made. Messages do not directly affect payoffs but can link decisions to information. This simple paradigm has been found useful in philosophy, linguistics, economics, political science and theoretical biology. The survey tracks the dialogue between the theory and experiments that have been inspired by this paradigm and is organized around the themes of available language, payoff structure and compositions of the sets of communicating players.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHandbook of Experimental Game Theory
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Pages311-347
Number of pages37
ISBN (Electronic)9781785363337
ISBN (Print)9781785363320
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • General Mathematics

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