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Serving many masters: an agent and his principals
Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror
Management Information Systems
Research output
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Article
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peer-review
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Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
Multiple Principals
100%
Service Contract
100%
Economic Viability
50%
Economies of Scale
50%
Monte Carlo Simulation
50%
Economic Surplus
50%
Cardinality
50%
First-principles Analysis
50%
Cooperative Game
50%
Pareto Optimal
50%
Risk-neutral
50%
Multiple Agents
50%
Computational Intractability
50%
Optimal Subset
50%
Service Capacity
50%
Strategic Decisions
50%
Agent Service
50%
Principal-agent
50%
Failure Characteristics
50%
Good Standing
50%
Mathematical Instruments
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Welfare
100%
Returns to Scale
100%
Economic Rent
100%
Cooperative Game
100%
Monte Carlo Simulation
100%
Principal-Agent
100%