TY - JOUR
T1 - Seller strategies for differentiation in highly competitive online auction markets
AU - Bockstedt, Jesse
AU - Goh, Kim
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments: the authors appear in alphabetical order. they thank Vladimir Zwass and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this research. the authors also thank yin-ling (Elaine) cheung for her research assistance. kim Huat Goh thanks Nanyang technological university for funding support under his start-up grant. Jesse Bockstedt thanks the George Mason university School of Management for providing summer research funding, which supported this work.
PY - 2011/1/1
Y1 - 2011/1/1
N2 - We explore the issue of seller differentiation in competitive auction environments, where most sellers have a high percentage of positive feedback. Analyzing a set of eBay auction listings for identical products, we find evidence that the use of visibility-enhancing and quality-signaling discretionary auction attributes affects auction outcomes throughout the auction process (i.e., listing views, bids, and price premiums). We also find strong evidence that the number of reputable sellers in an auction marketplace moderates the effects of these discretionary attributes on auction outcomes. Specifically, as auction environments become more competitive, these attributes become more effective tools for differentiation, whereas seller feedback scores become less effective. Furthermore, sellers appear to select their strategies for employing these discretionary attributes based on both their prior experience and the number of experienced reputable sellers in the market. These findings suggest that in addition to relying on feedback scores, online sellers must take a more strategic approach in the selection of discretionary attributes in their auction listings.
AB - We explore the issue of seller differentiation in competitive auction environments, where most sellers have a high percentage of positive feedback. Analyzing a set of eBay auction listings for identical products, we find evidence that the use of visibility-enhancing and quality-signaling discretionary auction attributes affects auction outcomes throughout the auction process (i.e., listing views, bids, and price premiums). We also find strong evidence that the number of reputable sellers in an auction marketplace moderates the effects of these discretionary attributes on auction outcomes. Specifically, as auction environments become more competitive, these attributes become more effective tools for differentiation, whereas seller feedback scores become less effective. Furthermore, sellers appear to select their strategies for employing these discretionary attributes based on both their prior experience and the number of experienced reputable sellers in the market. These findings suggest that in addition to relying on feedback scores, online sellers must take a more strategic approach in the selection of discretionary attributes in their auction listings.
KW - differentiation
KW - e-auctions
KW - online auctions
KW - seller differentiation
KW - signaling theory
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U2 - 10.2753/MIS0742-1222280307
DO - 10.2753/MIS0742-1222280307
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84857878924
VL - 28
SP - 235
EP - 268
JO - Journal of Management Information Systems
JF - Journal of Management Information Systems
SN - 0742-1222
IS - 3
ER -