Abstract
The intuitive difference between a system that choreographs the motion of its parts in the service of goals of its own formulation and a system composed of a collection of parts doing their own thing without coordination has been shaken by now familiar examples of self-organization. There is a broad and growing presumption in parts of philosophy and across the sciences that the appearance of centralized information-processing and control in the service of system-wide goals is mere appearance, i.e., an explanatory heuristic we have evolved to predict behavior, but one that will eventually get swept away in the advancing tide of self-organization. I argue that there is a distinction of central importance here, and that no adequate science of complex systems can dispense with it.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 327-351 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Philosophy of the Social Sciences |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2011 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Dennett
- dynamics
- intentional systems theory
- self-governance
- self-organization
- selves
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)