Self-Admissible sets

Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality."When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-Admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008]) characterizes "rationality and common assumption of rationality."We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory
EditorsAdam Brandenburger
PublisherWorld Scientific
Pages213-249
Number of pages37
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2023

Publication series

NameWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory
Volume5
ISSN (Print)2251-2071

Keywords

  • admissibility
  • epistemic game theory
  • iterated admissibility
  • perfect-information games
  • self-Admissible sets
  • weak dominance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Statistics and Probability

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