Self-admissible sets

Adam Brandenburger; Amanda Friedenberg

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003

Self-admissible sets

Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality." When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes "rationality and common assumption of rationality." We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	785-811
Number of pages	27
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	145
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003
State	Published - Mar 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Admissibility
Epistemic game theory
Iterated admissibility
Perfect-information games
Self-admissible sets
Weak dominance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003

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AB - Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality." When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes "rationality and common assumption of rationality." We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.

KW - Admissibility

KW - Epistemic game theory

KW - Iterated admissibility

KW - Perfect-information games

KW - Self-admissible sets

KW - Weak dominance

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Self-admissible sets

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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