Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

Soo Hong Chew; Mei Hui Mao; Stanley S. Reynolds

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2

Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

Soo Hong Chew
, Mei Hui Mao
, Stanley S. Reynolds

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-6
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	16
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2
State	Published - 1984

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2

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title = "Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers",

abstract = "This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.",

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N2 - This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.

AB - This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.

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U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2

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JO - Economics Letters

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Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

Abstract

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