Retributive Justice and Social Cooperation

Based on experiments in social evolution theory and game theory, this chapter argues two points: (a) the success of social groups depends on having punishers, and (b) punishers are supplying a public good, since those who cooperate but do not punish outperform those who cooperate and do punish. If we were simply forward-looking in our reasoning, as in the simple instrumental theory of rationality-if all payoffs are either current or anticipated, and not tied to past action-social cooperation would be a mystery. The chapter shows that for societies to thrive in the presence of noncooperative "free riders," it needs some members who are motivated to punish the free riders without instrumental justification-that is, as a matter of (evolved) sentiment or instinct rather than calculated, rational, utility-maximizing action. This, according to the chapter, accounts for both the existence of retributive "tastes" as well as their importance to social cooperation.