Abstract
We appraise the current status of relational contract theory, along with associated empirical studies, with the goal of providing an orientation to the field to economists who may not have expertise in contract theory. We begin with a theoretical discussion focusing mainly on intuition and the usefulness of the theory for conceptualizing applied agricultural contracting problems. We also discuss current theoretical challenges and the current state of empirical research on relational contracts. We conclude by discussing potentially fruitful areas for future research.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 111-127 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Annual Review of Resource Economics |
Volume | 12 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 6 2020 |
Keywords
- Agricultural contracts
- Incentives
- Relational contracts
- Repeated games
- Trust
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics