Abstract
Substantial dissatisfaction has emerged with the conceptualization of natural resource problems and individual decision making as represented in the tragedy of the commons model by Garret Hardin. A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing arrangements. The model of individual decision making on which the tragedy of the commons is based - perfect rationality - is also challenged. Perfect rationality cannot account for cooperation. Alternative models of decision making are explored.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 801-819+763 |
Journal | American Behavioral Scientist |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2002 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Psychology
- Cultural Studies
- Education
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)