TY - JOUR
T1 - Quasi-Insider Shareholder Activism
T2 - Corporate Governance at the Periphery of Control
AU - Cohn, Jonathan
AU - Towner, Mitch
AU - Virani, Aazam K
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
ß The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies.
PY - 2025/2/1
Y1 - 2025/2/1
N2 - We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.
AB - We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.
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U2 - 10.1093/rcfs/cfad016
DO - 10.1093/rcfs/cfad016
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85216412617
SN - 2046-9128
VL - 14
SP - 1
EP - 34
JO - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
JF - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
IS - 1
ER -