TY - JOUR
T1 - Quantum theory
T2 - A pragmatist approach
AU - Healey, Richard
N1 - Funding Information:
under the Templeton Research Fellows Program ‘Philosophers-Physicists Cooperation Project on the Nature of Quantum Reality’, and additionally to Xiaosong Ma and the other scientists in the Institute for many enlightening discussions and for permission to reproduce Figure 2. I also wish to acknowledge the support of the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics under their sabbatical program, and to thank its members and visitors for the intellectual stimulation they provided during my visit in Fall 2009. Research at the Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through Industry Canada and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research and Innovation. Finally, I wish to thank the University of Sydney and Huw Price, Director of the Centre for the Study of Time, for inviting me to give a series of lectures early in 2010 in conjunction with the award of an International Visiting Research Fellowship, thereby providing the stimulus and opportunity to share these ideas at a formative stage.
PY - 2012/12
Y1 - 2012/12
N2 - While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate.1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion
AB - While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate.1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion
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U2 - 10.1093/bjps/axr054
DO - 10.1093/bjps/axr054
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84869109791
SN - 0007-0882
VL - 63
SP - 729
EP - 771
JO - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
JF - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
IS - 4
ER -