TY - JOUR
T1 - Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
AU - Noussair, Charles N.
AU - van Soest, Daan
AU - Stoop, Jan
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, NWO, for financial support as part of the Program on Evolution and Behavior. We would like to thank Ben and Shirley Willems for use of their fishing facility, and Paul Ludena Delgado, Joris Hoendervangers, Stef van Kessel, and Menusch Khadjavi for excellent research assistance. We thank two anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants at Iowa State and Nottingham Universities for helpful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2015/10/1
Y1 - 2015/10/1
N2 - We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation.
AB - We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0841-8
DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0841-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85027923425
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 45
SP - 537
EP - 559
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 3
ER -