Property institutions and the limits of Coase


Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


Coase's (1960) contractual single-exchange framework is challenged by Arruñada (2017) as a framework that cannot be used to understand the complex nature of property law and related institutions. Arruñada proposes the sequential exchange model as an alternative framework. Differences between the two approaches are considered and some applications in land and natural resources are used to evaluate his critique. These cases support Arruñada's critique of the simple contracting approach to property, showing that for many natural resources private contracting has not been the solution and that a mix of property institutions govern. Contrary to Arruñada, however, I argue that the limits of the single-exchange framework arise not because of sequential exchange, but because assets (parcels of land) are complex and physically connected.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-8
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Institutional Economics
StateAccepted/In press - May 10 2017
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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