Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo; Martin Dufwenberg; Stefano Papa; Francesco Passarelli

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931

Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa, Francesco Passarelli

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	110931
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	222
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931
State	Published - Jan 2023

Keywords

Guilt aversion
Informal agreements
Promise-keeping

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931

Cite this

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title = "Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication",

abstract = "In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals{\textquoteright} inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.",

keywords = "Guilt aversion, Informal agreements, Promise-keeping",

author = "{Di Bartolomeo}, Giovanni and Martin Dufwenberg and Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli",

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AU - Dufwenberg, Martin

AU - Papa, Stefano

AU - Passarelli, Francesco

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AB - In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

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KW - Informal agreements

KW - Promise-keeping

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Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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