Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa, Francesco Passarelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number110931
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume222
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2023

Keywords

  • Guilt aversion
  • Informal agreements
  • Promise-keeping

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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