Polycentricity and state reinforced self-governance: the case of the New York City watersheds governing arrangement

Social-ecological systems are often governed through polycentric governing arrangements comprising independent centers of decision making that interact through coordination, cooperation, competition, and conflict across different functional domains. A rapidly growing body of literature explores the design and performance of polycentric arrangements, but less attention has been paid to what Vincent Ostrom called “the general system of rules” that enable the emergence of polycentric governing arrangements. As part of this special feature, we further elaborate polycentricity theory, especially the general system of rules, and we use state reinforced selfgovernance (SRSG) principles to evaluate the performance of polycentric arrangements. We apply the theory to the New York City Watersheds arrangement, a polycentric system created and governed by a formal agreement made among more than 50 local governments, environmental organizations, and state and federal actors for the protection and management of high-quality drinking water sources. We conduct a qualitative content analysis of the legislation and regulations that constitute the general system of rules, the Memorandum of Agreement that created the governing arrangement, and the regulations and policies that implement the governing arrangement. Although we find that the general system of rules and the design of the New York City Watersheds governing arrangement have facilitated the emergence of collaboration for providing high quality drinking water, both exhibit gaps that pose challenges for the continued viability of the governing arrangement. We conclude that the SRSG principles are useful for further conceptualizing and evaluating the general system of rules and whether they enable polycentric systems to emerge, representing an important addition to the theory of polycentricity.