Abstract
We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1211-1237 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | American Economic Review |
Volume | 101 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2011 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
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Replication data for: Participation
Charness, G. (Creator) & Dufwenberg, M. (Creator), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2011
DOI: 10.3886/e112429, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/112429
Dataset
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Replication data for: Participation
Charness, G. (Creator) & Dufwenberg, M. (Creator), ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2011
DOI: 10.3886/e112429v1, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/112429/version/V1/view
Dataset