Gary Charness, Martin Dufwenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

76 Scopus citations


We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1211-1237
Number of pages27
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jun 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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