Abstract
Much attention has been paid to the issue of whether, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses what we would recognize as deontic concepts. On the basis of a study of dei and other constructions I argue that Aristotle's use of them is often misconstrued and should be interpreted as giving reasons that are reasons of virtue, not a distinct alternative. Many issues remain live in the interpretation (and the translation) of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics; in this essay I offer a contribution to one of these, the nature and role of deontic concepts in the work. I offer this essay with pleasure to a celebration of Terry and Gail's work.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Virtue, Happiness, Knowledge |
Subtitle of host publication | Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 184-196 |
Number of pages | 13 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198817277 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 23 2018 |
Keywords
- Aristotle
- Dei
- Deontic concepts
- Duty
- Reasons
- Virtue
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)