Optimal revocations in ephemeral networks: A game-theoretic framework

Igor Bilogrevic, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Maxim Raya, Jean Pierre Hubaux

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

Revocation of public-key certificates is an important security primitive. In this paper, we design a fully distributed local certificate revocation scheme for ephemeral networks - a class of extremely volatile wireless networks with short-duration and short-range communications - based on a game-theoretic approach. First, by providing incentives, we can guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes even if they collude. Second, thanks to the records of past behavior, we dynamically adapt the parameters to nodes' reputations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) on-the-fly, minimizing the social cost of the revocation. Third, based on the analytical results, we define a unique optimal NE selection protocol and evaluate its performance through simulations. We show that our scheme is effective in quickly and efficiently removing malicious devices from the network.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWiOpt 2010 - 8th Intl. Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
Pages21-30
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event8th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2010 - Avignon, France
Duration: May 31 2010Jun 4 2010

Publication series

NameWiOpt 2010 - 8th Intl. Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks

Conference

Conference8th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2010
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityAvignon
Period5/31/106/4/10

Keywords

  • Ephemeral networks
  • Game theory
  • Social optimum
  • Wireless security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Control and Optimization

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