Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand

Teun Draaisma; Charles Noussair

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81894-0

Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand

Teun Draaisma, Charles Noussair

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We partially characterize a class of symmetric, monotonic, Bayes-Nash equilibria to a uniform-price sealed-bid auction in an environment in which each demander wishes to purchase multiple units.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	157-162
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	56
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81894-0
State	Published - Oct 17 1997
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Auction Multi-unit auction Sealed bid Uniform price C70

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81894-0

Cite this

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Optimal bidding in a uniform price auction with multi-unit demand

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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