Abstract
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 325-349 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Philosophical Review |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy