On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

66 Scopus citations


What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)325-349
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophical Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2009
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


Dive into the research topics of 'On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if)'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this