On the geography of conventions

Andreas Blume; Ted Temzelides

doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0350-3

On the geography of conventions

Andreas Blume, Ted Temzelides

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	863-873
Number of pages	11
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	22
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0350-3
State	Published - Nov 2003
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Equilibrium selection
Evolutionary dynamics
Restricted mobility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-002-0350-3

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keywords = "Equilibrium selection, Evolutionary dynamics, Restricted mobility",

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AB - We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.

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KW - Evolutionary dynamics

KW - Restricted mobility

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On the geography of conventions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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