Abstract
We consider a Walrasian exchange economy in which an agent is characterized by a utility function, a random endowment vector, and a function that specifies the minimum expenditure necessary for survival at a given price system. If at any equilibrium price system, the income of the agent is no more than the minimum expenditure for survival, it is ruined. The main results characterize the probability of ruin when the number of agents is large. The implications of stochastic dependence among agents are explored.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 133-153 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Review of Economic Design |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2001 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)