TY - GEN
T1 - On Algorand Transaction Fees
T2 - 2022 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2022
AU - Abbasi, Maryam
AU - Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein
AU - Ashiqur Rahman, Mohammad
AU - Akkaya, Kemal
AU - Jadliwala, Murtuza
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 IEEE.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Algorand is a public proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain with a throughput of 750 MB of transactions per hour, 125 times more than Bitcoin. While the throughput of Algorand depends on the participation of most of its nodes, rational nodes may behave selfishly and not cooperate with others. To encourage nodes to participate in the consensus protocol, Algorand rewards nodes in each round. However, currently Algorand does not pay transaction fees to participating nodes, rather storing it for future use. In this paper, we show that this current approach of Algorand motivates selfish block proposers to increase their profits by creating empty blocks. Such selfish behavior reduces the throughput of Algorand. Therefore, the price of Algo will decrease in the long run. Because of this price reduction, nodes will leave Algorand, compromising its security. Moreover, lack of an appropriate mechanism to pay fees to participants causes additional issues, such as lack of transparency, centralization, and inability of nodes to prioritize transactions. To overcome this challenge, we design a perfectly competitive market and propose an algorithm for computing optimal transaction fees and block size in Algorand We also propose an algorithm that reduces the cost of Algorand, without compromising its security. We further simulate the Algorand network and show how the optimal transaction fee and block size can be calculated in practice.
AB - Algorand is a public proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain with a throughput of 750 MB of transactions per hour, 125 times more than Bitcoin. While the throughput of Algorand depends on the participation of most of its nodes, rational nodes may behave selfishly and not cooperate with others. To encourage nodes to participate in the consensus protocol, Algorand rewards nodes in each round. However, currently Algorand does not pay transaction fees to participating nodes, rather storing it for future use. In this paper, we show that this current approach of Algorand motivates selfish block proposers to increase their profits by creating empty blocks. Such selfish behavior reduces the throughput of Algorand. Therefore, the price of Algo will decrease in the long run. Because of this price reduction, nodes will leave Algorand, compromising its security. Moreover, lack of an appropriate mechanism to pay fees to participants causes additional issues, such as lack of transparency, centralization, and inability of nodes to prioritize transactions. To overcome this challenge, we design a perfectly competitive market and propose an algorithm for computing optimal transaction fees and block size in Algorand We also propose an algorithm that reduces the cost of Algorand, without compromising its security. We further simulate the Algorand network and show how the optimal transaction fee and block size can be calculated in practice.
KW - Algorand and Blockchain Incentive Design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85137265209&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85137265209&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9838795
DO - 10.1109/ICC45855.2022.9838795
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85137265209
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 5403
EP - 5408
BT - ICC 2022 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 16 May 2022 through 20 May 2022
ER -