Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable

Diego Moreno, Mark Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


Recent papers by Barberá and Peleg and by Zhou have established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem remains valid when individuals are restricted to reporting only "reasonable" preferences. We present a theorem that covers situations in which, as in Barberá-and-Peleg and Zhou, preferences may be restricted to reasonable ones, but in which, additionally, it may be known in advance that some dimensions of the social decision do not affect all the participants - i.e., in which the social decisions are partially decomposable into decisions that affect only subsets of the participants. As in the previous theorems, the conclusion of this new theorem is that nonmanipulable voting schemes must be dictatorial.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-233
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 1991

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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