Nash, bargaining and evolution

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1185-1198
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume88
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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