Mental Causation

Cei Maslen; Terry Horgan; Helen Daly

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0025

Mental Causation

Cei Maslen, Terry Horgan, Helen Daly

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Mental causation is held so dear because it seems essential in order for people to do anything (at least voluntarily). If one accepts Davidson's view that motivating reasons are causes, then (as Kim puts it) 'agency is possible only if mental causation is possible'. Many kinds of mental items are supposed to be causes: beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, the contents of beliefs and desires, and the phenomenal mental properties of sensations and beliefs (i.e. those properties such that there is 'something it is like' to experience them, if sensations and beliefs have such properties). Not only are mental states supposed to be causes (and effects), but so also are mental properties.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of Causation
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780191577246
ISBN (Print)	9780199279739
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0025
State	Published - Jan 2 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Contents of beliefs
Emotions
Mental causation
Mental properties
Mental states
Sensations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Arts and Humanities

Access to Document

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0025

Cite this

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KW - Mental properties

KW - Mental states

KW - Sensations

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Mental Causation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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