TY - JOUR
T1 - Measuring the Cost of Privacy
T2 - A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining
AU - Kucik, Jeffrey
AU - Pelc, Krzysztof J.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Cambridge University Press 2015.
PY - 2016/10/1
Y1 - 2016/10/1
N2 - Transparency is one of the most contested aspects of international organizations. While observers frequently call for greater oversight of policy making, evidence suggests that settlement between states is more likely when negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) legal body provides a useful illustration of these competing perspectives. As in many courts, WTO dispute settlement is designed explicitly to facilitate settlement through private consultations. However, this study argues that the privacy of negotiations creates opportunities for states to strike deals that disadvantage others. Looking at product-level trade flows from all disputes between 1995 and 2011, it finds that private (early) settlements lead to discriminatory trade outcomes - complainant countries gain disproportionately more than the rest of the membership. When the facts of a case are made known through a ruling, these disproportional gains disappear entirely. The article also finds that third-party participation - commonly criticized for making settlement less likely - significantly reduces disparities in post-dispute trade. It then draws parallels to domestic law and concludes with a set of policy prescriptions.
AB - Transparency is one of the most contested aspects of international organizations. While observers frequently call for greater oversight of policy making, evidence suggests that settlement between states is more likely when negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) legal body provides a useful illustration of these competing perspectives. As in many courts, WTO dispute settlement is designed explicitly to facilitate settlement through private consultations. However, this study argues that the privacy of negotiations creates opportunities for states to strike deals that disadvantage others. Looking at product-level trade flows from all disputes between 1995 and 2011, it finds that private (early) settlements lead to discriminatory trade outcomes - complainant countries gain disproportionately more than the rest of the membership. When the facts of a case are made known through a ruling, these disproportional gains disappear entirely. The article also finds that third-party participation - commonly criticized for making settlement less likely - significantly reduces disparities in post-dispute trade. It then draws parallels to domestic law and concludes with a set of policy prescriptions.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0007123414000520
DO - 10.1017/S0007123414000520
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84921861755
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 46
SP - 861
EP - 889
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 4
ER -